ning,"2 was among the first of Weber's essays to be translated.3 The implication seems to be that the later version is more comprehensive and sophisticated, hence that the original is superfluous. We disagree, believing that the original is remarkable in a number of ways, and even, in certain important respects, far superior.4 First, the essay sheds new light on Weber's intellectual biography and the contours of his scientific development. Second, it has significant implications for the interpretive debates which rage around the Weber corpus. Finally, it retains contemporary empirical and theoretical significance in its own right. Its implications for a range of different specialities are striking indeed.s . She records how the other German intellectuals accompanying the Webers were repulsed by the cold, impersonal products of the new world's "capitalistic spirit," which they contrasted to German "congeniality" (Gemiitlichkeit). Weber, on the other hand, enthralled by the new, held out for a more considered opinion. During the four months of his stay, he sought out ordinary Americans in all walks of life and almost every section of the country. The fruit of this activity, according to Marianne, was his discovery of the "moral kernel" beneath America's objectified shell. "Weber eagerly absorbed all this," she writes. "He was stimulated to give effortlessly of his own resources what was able to delight these simple people, and thus he unearthed in them the treasures of the experiences of a lifetime (p. 299)." Weber himself wrote that the trip had widened his scholarly horizons as well as improving his health. "Its fruits in this respect can, of course, not be seen for some time (p. 304)."
What did Weber see in America that stimulated him so? We believe that it was a glimmer of a way out of the "iron cage" of reified modern society. Modernity was depicted throughout the German university system6 in dualistic terms similar to Ferdinand T6nnies's famous set of types, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. The Gemeinschaft represented the traditional, pre-industrial "community," which was seen as an organic totality in which an elite governed in the name of values common to the entire group. The Gesellschaft, on the contrary, represented modern, industrial "society," a mechanistic grouping of individuals who felt no common will or values, sharing only a set of instrumental ends. The epitome of the Gesellschaft to most German academics was mass democratic society. Most importantly, the Gesellschaft was seen as something essentially negative7-as the decay of the Gemeinschaft, as the dissolution of the organic unity into an atomistic "sandpile" in which material interests became independent from the meaningful ideal realm. The process of modernization from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft was viewed, in these terms, as a tragic one in which something was irretrievably lost.8 It was to resist this trend that mainstream academics sought to reinforce the traditional elites, which included, along with themselves, the nobility and the bureaucracy.9
Weber never identified with this traditional position. The very forces which most academics saw as the antidote to the Gesellschaft-Protestant religious ideals, academic learning, the bureaucratic establishment and even the nobility-were described by him as contributors to the modernization process.'0 In "Churches and Sects," for example, he describes the established (Lutheran) church of Germany as indifferent to values, as rigidly institutionalized and overly abstract when compared to the highly committed sects. In placing a rather mystical ceremonial element beside an ambition for secular power, the 1 established church is seen by Weber as inherently hypocritical. Further, the church is identified with both the state bureaucracy and the German tradition of learning (Bildung), the basic components of the German elite.11
At the same time, however, Weber was attracted throughout much of his work to the same dichotomizing framework as his traditional colleagues, and to the same vision of decline. Insofar as these powerful sympathies ruled his later work, he ascribed only instrumental motives to modern actors and groups, for values in modern society had become dissolved into reified forms. In such a modern society, ethical and moral problems are reduced to the existential concerns of heroic individuals. This treatment of modern society in Weber's later work, in other words, conforms to the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft dichotomy.
In "Churches and Sects," however, one sees another view of modernity which stands more fully at odds with that of Weber's colleagues, a view which becomes very much muted in the later revised version of the essay. This aspect concerns the possibility of breaking through the iron cage. Weber, unlike most other German academics, did not seek to retreat to some kind of organic Gemeinschaft, traditional or "modern." Any attempt to combine an organic unity with modernity represented the same inherent hypocrisy he saw in the established German church. Rather, he sought a new type of Gesellschaft based on a more complex form of rational conduct,'2 a form which combined purposive rational action with an adherence to values. It was in "Churches and Sects" that this new form made its appearance, reappearing only occasionally in the subsequent years. Finally, at the end of Weber's life, it took on a new, explicitly political form. 3
II
We see three important elements in this essay: (1) the concept of "Europeanization," (2) the description of the American sect as a Gesellschaft, and (3) the relationship of the sect to the American democracy. These elements are almost completely absent from the revised version (see note 4).
Weber sees "Europeanization" as a form of secularization characterized by "church"-like moral indifference. To this phenomenon he contrasts an American form of secularization in which "sect"-like commitment is adopted by nonreligious clubs. Thus, "Europeanization" means not simply secularization but rather the encroachment of the "church" model of social organization upon a more sect-like one. He is not talking, in other words, about the Gesellschaft encroaching upon the Gemeinschaft, for he believed that America had no real organic traditional entity, but about the encroachment of one form of Gesellschaft upon another. For Weber, sect-like religion is not traditional, i.e., not gemeinschaftlich, a denial which is consistent with his assignment of its origins to the Reformation. He distinguishes, then, between "modernization" and "secularization." While the two can be coterminous, they are not necessarily synonymous.
Because these two concepts are not identical for Weber, he believes that in modern societies the "functions" of religion can be maintained even while the institution is altered. These functions can be fulfilled by secular groups, whose role is largely defined by the nature of the religious community from which they grew. Historically prior religious communities, then, established the dominant cultural code or schema, and the succeeding forms embody this initial impulse. Thus, Weber wrote: This unusual understanding of secularization leads to a decisive critique of the univocal rationalization thesis and, in turn, to an extensive elaboration of the decisive role played by religion in modernity. If contemporary institutions inherit an initial religious impulse, then rationalization, or modernization, cannot be seen simply as an objective development which possesses a purely universal, cross-national character. Modernization occurs within historically-specific "modes of life," modes which vary according to the religion which is hegemonic at the outset of the secularization process. Weber's concern here is particularly the contrast between America and Germany. It is "the fate of us Germans," he observes, that "the religious revolution at that time [i.e., the Reformation,] meant a development that favored not the energy of the individual but the prestige of the 'office' " (p. 39).14 In America, these religious forces resulted in a "radical idealism" (Mommsen, Max Weber, p. 76) which fostered individualism, flexibility and democracy.
Weber sees in church and sect life, therefore, deeply contrasting modes of modern social organization, modes which are established in the first instance by the cultural codes of religious life. But Weber also traces in this essay on American society certain more specific consequences of the sect tradition. Its implications for economic life are widely known from his more famous works, for example, from The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. In light of "Churches and Sects", it is worth noting one theme in that famous work which deserves greater emphasis. Weber is more concerned with the institutionalized forms that ideas take and the relationship of conduct to those forms than he is with religious and intellectual history per se. When discussing the sects' dedication, for example, Weber admits that they often display indifference (p. 30); but he insists that this is an indifference to dogma rather than to reli- This focus on institutionalization, moreover, makes it more clear here than in most of his other discussions that Weber sees capitalism merely as one form of moder and rational activity among many; as such, the social and cultural conditions of modernity must be established on more general grounds than by pointing to the needs of capitalist development. True, participation in Baptist or Quaker sects provided would-be businessmen with respected creditratings. This should not be seen, however, as the main function of the Protestant ethic, but rather as one particular institutionalization of a general cultural form.
This general cultural form ensures that even in the most moder society there will be "on-going inquiries about moral and social conduct." Such inquiries guarantee that the individuals with whom one interacts have the proper "social qualities," qualities which are linked to achievement. Organizations set standards for membership which are geared to specific types of action, not to qualities generated by birth. Membership, then, is open, and it is such membership, or "achieved quality," that guarantees the honorableness of the individuals with whom one interacts. "The old 'sect spirit' holds sway with relentless effect in the intrinsic nature of such associations," Weber writes, for the sect was the first mass organization to combine individual and social in this way. In the sect, the religious qualifications bestowed on the individual by God could be evidenced only by this-worldly action: "Life-long sober diligence in one's 'calling' appears as the specific, indeed, really the only, form by which one can demonstrate his qualification as a Christian and therewith his moral legitimation for membership" (p. 30). In sect society, grace is an achievement by individuals, an achievement, ironically, which guarantees sociability. Sect-like organization, therefore, is the only way to ensure trust in a differentiated and mobile society.
Ill
It is important that in assigning the sect to one of Tbnnies's institutional ideal types, Weber chooses the Gesellschaft rather than the Gemeinschaft. He writes:
The individual [sect member] seeks to maintain his own position by becoming a member of a social group. ... The social association to which the individual belongs is for him never something "organic," never a mystical total essence which floats over him and envelops him. Rather, he is always completely conscious of it as a mechanism for his own material and ideal ends (Zwecke). (p. 38) Accordingly, Weber emphasizes the rational individualism fostered by American sects. Membership in the sect was voluntary rather than ascribed, and was based on the individual's religious "qualification," i.e., his ability to uphold certain ethical standards. Again, the example of the North Carolina banker is enlightening. He was not born into a religious group in which he felt some kind of organic oneness with the other members. Rather, whatever his motives-commercial, religious or a mixture of the two-he made a conscious decision to join the sect and uphold its ethical standards. While he will reap certain advantages from his position, he will also accept the responsibility to constantly "prove" his worthiness. Should he fail to meet these individual responsibilities, the contract is broken and he is excluded. His conduct reflects "cool objectivity" (Sachlichkeit) and "purposive activity" (Zwecktatigkeit). The sect itself, then, is not an institution which is somehow greater than the sum of its parts. Rather it is a collection of individuals who engage in reciprocal acts of "probation" for the sake of certain individual ideal and material ends. In this sense it is a classic Gesellschaft.
Yet, the sect differs from the mainstream German academic conception of Gesellschaft in that it is not barren of values.16 While the conduct of the sect members is rational, it is also strongly tied to values. The best example Weber provides is that of the Quakers, who are willing to undergo great humiliation rather than compromise their values. This vision of a modern actor whose very rationality is rooted deeply in value standards allows us to understand a nonutilitarian aspect in Weber's later discussions of rationality. In much of Weber's later writings, rational action takes on anti-valuative tones, just as terms like "objectivity" (Sachlichkeit) take on an aura of reification. But even in his later writings there is another vision of modern life which competes with this prophesy of the iron cage. The antithetical notion is articulated by the concept of complex rationality, which embodies a substantive moral definition of rational action. Not until "Politics as a Vocation" can one gain such insight into this conception of rational conduct as in "Churches and Sects. "17 Our connection of these two essays is not arbitrary, for with its treatment of the sects' relationship to American democracy, "Churches and Sects" also makes a contribution to the discussion of Weber's political ideas. His description of the latter is especially positive, rejecting the assertions of those who see democracy as "a mass fragmented into atoms." Rather, he writes, American democracy is filled with exclusivities which promote high individual standards and responsibilities. Democracy allows for fluidity, so individuals are constantly confronting new It is the German established church, Weber notes here, which subordinates individual values to the bureaucratic state, granting the state legitimation in return for certain privileges. The German bureaucracy was a reified system disguised as a moral one. The city machine, on the other hand, has no such pretensions; devoid of moral legitimation, it does not represent the same threat to the ethical conduct of the individual.
American sect organization produced at least two important qualities that Weber saw as crucial for the political rejuvenation of Germany: a strong individualism and a tendency to form cohesive social groups open to all social strata. The sect, for Weber, was a mass organization whose cohesiveness was based neither on an organic spiritual unity nor on a materialistically organized interest; rather it was based on individual achievement and responsibility. When, at the end of his career, Weber returned to this critical study of comparative political morality, this sect-inspired quality emerges as the now famous "ethic of responsibility"-the only substantively rational norm that can guide the modern political vocation. Sect-like qualities were necessary if democratic political institutions characterized by a union of moral commitment and rational perspective were to emerge in Germany. For this to happen, the existing bureaucratic system-the iron cage-would have to be dismantled, a task Weber now assigned to charismatic political leadership. Weber's theoretical ambivalence, and the applied, programmatic nature of this later work, led him to discuss the sources of democratic change in this purely political, acultural way. Yet it seems clear that one lineage of his "ethic of responsibility" goes back to his earlier emphasis on the role of sects. The failures of his later theory of plebiscitary democracy, in fact, may be connected to Weber's inability to make this link explicit and distinct. 18 The reasons for the eventual attenuation of Weber's sect-church dualism can be linked to the predicament Weber faced in 1906. Despite his admiration for sect-democracy and American political life, Weber saw no way of transforming the socio-religious conduct of Germany in a similar way. His optimism about the American Gesellschaft is matched by his pessimism about the German one. At the same time, Weber saw the American sect-like institutions being threatened by "Europeanization," a fear that became greater toward the end of his life.19 In the American religious sects he had discovered a unique creature which, despite its importance, was faced with extinction from the form of modernization that Europe represented. Weber's earliest hope seems to have been to find a home for that creature in Germanyindeed, to use his knowledge of the true underpinnings of American democracy to transform Europe itself. This hope lay dormant until the turmoil at the end of the First World War. Ironically it was at this later time that the revised version of "Churches and Sects" appeared. In this later essay, some of the most 4
